Revision Cards
How to use: Scan these cards immediately before a mock assessment or review session. They are memory prompts — not substitutes for the full knowledge files. If a card reveals a gap, open the linked file and update your Weak Spots Tracker before continuing.
Group 1 — Core Mechanics
| Concept | One-line reminder | Watch out for | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
| Illiquidity premium | Extra return demanded for locking up capital; must be earned, not assumed | It is not guaranteed — bad entry pricing or poor management can eliminate it entirely | illiquidity-premium |
| J-curve | Early negative returns (fees, unrealised portfolio) followed by recovery and harvest | Subscription lines flatten the trough and lift IRR without improving underlying performance | j-curve |
| Capital commitment | Total amount an LP pledges; drawn via capital calls over the investment period | Commitment ≠ money transferred; the unfunded portion is a contingent future obligation, not a sunk cost | capital-commitments |
| Capital call / drawdown | GP’s formal request for LPs to transfer a tranche of committed capital | ”Drawdown” also describes the J-curve’s negative phase — two distinct meanings, check context | capital-calls |
| Unfunded commitment | Committed capital not yet called; callable at any time during the investment period | Multiple simultaneous calls against insufficient liquidity is overcommitment risk — model it explicitly | capital-commitments |
| Distribution | Return of capital or profits from fund to LPs; recallable or non-recallable | Recallable distributions are not permanent — treat as contingent until the recall window closes | distributions |
| Recycling provision | Exit proceeds reinvested within the fund rather than distributed; keeps DPI at zero | LPs with distribution obligations lose access to cash for the recycling period | recycling-provisions |
| Vintage year | The year a fund begins investing; defines entry pricing and exit environment | Never compare IRRs across vintages without context — macro conditions drive most of the difference | vintage-year |
Group 2 — Fund Structures and Economics
| Concept | One-line reminder | Watch out for | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
| Limited partnership | Dominant closed-ended fund structure; GP manages, LP invests, LP liability capped at commitment | LP loses limited liability if it participates in management — must remain passive | limited-partnerships |
| GP (General Partner) | Fund manager; unlimited liability; decision-making authority; earns management fee and carry | GP has fiduciary duties to LPs but also structural conflicts of interest — LPAC oversight is the check | gp-lp-roles |
| LP (Limited Partner) | Investor; limited liability; passive; commits capital and receives distributions | Any active management role risks reclassification as GP and loss of liability protection | gp-lp-roles |
| LPAC | Committee of LP representatives; consent rights on conflicts and key GP decisions; not a governing body | Cannot direct investments or override the GP — advisory and protective role only | gp-lp-roles |
| Side letter | Bilateral GP–LP agreement supplementing the LPA; negotiates MFN, fees, co-invest, or exclusions | GP must disclose existence to LPAC; favourable terms to one LP may disadvantage others | limited-partnerships |
| Open-ended fund | No fixed term; periodic subscriptions and redemptions at NAV; subject to gates and notice periods | NAV is appraisal-based, not market-clearing; redemptions can be gated or suspended | open-ended-vs-closed-ended-funds |
| Closed-ended fund | Fixed capital raise, 10-year term (typically), no redemptions; returns via exits and distributions | No liquidity during the term unless LP sells its interest on the secondary market | open-ended-vs-closed-ended-funds |
| Gate | Limits total redemptions per period in an open-ended fund to prevent a run | Protects remaining investors; can delay redeeming LPs materially — gates may stack across periods | open-ended-vs-closed-ended-funds |
| Lock-up | Period during which hedge fund investors cannot redeem; typically 1–2 years | Lock-up expiry ≠ immediate redemption — notice periods and gates still apply after lock-up | hedge-funds |
| Side pocket | Segregated sleeve for illiquid assets in an open-ended fund; redeeming investors excluded | Legitimate protective tool — but can also be used to conceal problem assets; scrutinise the classification | hedge-funds |
| Co-investment | Direct deal participation alongside a fund; typically zero or reduced fees and carry | Lower cost but concentrated single-deal risk; access depends on LP relationship with GP | co-investments |
| Fund of funds (FoF) | Invests in other funds; diversification at the cost of two fee layers | Double fees (FoF + underlying) materially reduce net LP return — always compare on a net basis | fund-of-funds |
| Secondaries | Purchase of existing LP interests (LP-led) or GP restructuring of a fund (GP-led/continuation) | Discount to NAV is not always a bargain — verify whether the NAV itself is reliable | secondaries |
| Continuation fund | GP transfers assets from a maturing fund into a new vehicle; LPs choose cash-out or roll-over | A form of GP-led secondary; conflict of interest — GP prefers extension, some LPs prefer exit | secondaries |
| SMA (Separately Managed Account) | Bespoke mandate for a single large LP; customised strategy, reporting, and governance | Requires very large minimum commitment and higher operational overhead for the GP | separate-managed-accounts |
| Carried interest | GP performance fee; typically 20% of profits above the hurdle rate | Carry is earned on profits above the hurdle — a fund returning only invested capital earns no carry | carried-interest |
| Preferred return / hurdle rate | Minimum annual return LPs receive before GP earns carry; typically 8% compound | Hard hurdle: carry only on excess returns; soft hurdle: catch-up applies to all profits — very different economics | carried-interest |
| Catch-up | Allows GP to receive a higher profit share until it reaches its target carry percentage | Catch-up stops when GP’s share reaches the agreed %; a 100% catch-up is faster and more GP-friendly | carried-interest |
| Waterfall | The sequenced steps for distributing fund profits between LPs and GP | The order matters — return of capital, then preferred return, then catch-up, then split | waterfalls |
| European waterfall | Whole-fund: all capital returned first, then preferred return, then catch-up, then 80/20 split | GP waits longest for carry; most LP-friendly structure; carry is only earned on whole-fund profit | waterfalls |
| American waterfall | Deal-by-deal: carry earned on each profitable exit even if other deals lose money | Less LP-friendly; clawback provisions must exist to protect LPs from over-payment of carry | waterfalls |
| Management fee | Annual fee on committed (investment period) then invested (harvest period) capital; covers GP costs | Fee base transition is negotiated; some GPs define “invested” differently — affects fee level materially | fee-calculations |
| Fee offset | Portfolio company fees earned by GP that reduce the LP management fee | Not all GPs apply full offsets; the percentage varies — check the LPA, not GP marketing materials | fee-calculations |
Group 3 — NAV and Valuation
| Concept | One-line reminder | Watch out for | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
| NAV (Net Asset Value) | Total fund assets minus liabilities; basis for LP capital accounts and all performance metrics | NAV is an estimate for private funds, not a market-clearing price; reflects judgement, not observable value | nav |
| GAV vs NAV | GAV = assets before fund-level debt; NAV = GAV minus fund-level liabilities | Portfolio company debt is already embedded in each asset’s fair value within GAV; only fund-level debt reduces NAV | nav |
| Investor-level NAV | LP’s individual capital account: contributions minus distributions plus allocated gains minus fees | Differs from fund-level NAV per unit due to timing, equalisation, and fee arrangements | nav |
| Estimated NAV vs Final NAV | Estimated = preliminary; Final = audited/confirmed; gap is widest in stressed markets | Redemptions priced at Estimated NAV may be resettled when Final NAV differs — operationally significant | nav |
| Level 1 inputs | Quoted prices in active markets for identical assets; observable without adjustment | Rare in private funds — applies only to listed equity positions held by a fund | valuation-risk |
| Level 2 inputs | Observable inputs other than direct quoted prices (e.g. credit spreads, comparable transactions) | Can drop to Level 3 in stressed markets when the reference market becomes inactive | valuation-risk |
| Level 3 inputs | Unobservable; management’s own models and assumptions; used for virtually all PE holdings | Level 3 ≠ low quality — it means independent verification is structurally harder; can still be rigorous | valuation-risk |
| Valuation risk | Risk that stated NAV does not reflect realisable value; greatest for Level 3 assets | Smoothed returns and low reported volatility are symptoms, not reassurance | valuation-risk |
Group 4 — Performance Metrics
| Concept | One-line reminder | Watch out for | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
| TVPI | (Distributions + Residual NAV) ÷ Paid-In Capital; total value realised and unrealised | TVPI is soft while RVPI is high — unrealised gains may not be realisable at stated values | tvpi |
| DPI | Distributions ÷ Paid-In Capital; cash actually returned; the only truly “hard” metric | Low DPI in a mature fund (year 8+) is a red flag; high DPI = value delivered, not just stated | dpi |
| RVPI | Residual NAV ÷ Paid-In Capital; unrealised value remaining; should decline as fund matures | RVPI rising or flat in a mature fund may indicate stale valuations or inability to exit | rvpi |
| IRR | Annualised return making NPV of all cash flows zero; time-sensitive | Subscription lines inflate IRR without improving performance; always compare with MOIC and PME | irr |
| Gross IRR vs Net IRR | Gross = before fees and carry; Net = LP return after all deductions; gap typically 3–5% | Never compare one fund’s gross IRR to another’s net — they are not comparable figures | irr |
| MOIC | Total value ÷ invested capital; time-insensitive multiple | MOIC ignores how long capital was at risk; pair with IRR; 2× in 3 years ≠ 2× in 8 years | moic |
| PME (Public Market Equivalent) | Compares private fund cash flows to the same flows invested in a public index | PME < 1.0 means the public index outperformed; positive IRR does not guarantee positive PME | public-market-equivalent |
| High water mark (HWM) | In hedge funds: performance fees only charged on gains above the previous NAV peak | HWM is per share class or series — a new subscriber may have a different HWM to existing investors | hedge-funds |
Group 5 — Capital Activity and Operations
| Concept | One-line reminder | Watch out for | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subscription | Formal process of joining a fund: documents, KYC, legal signing, then capital transfer | Capital must not move before KYC is complete — fund is in breach if it does | subscriptions |
| Subscription line facility | Short-term credit line bridges investments ahead of LP capital calls; LP cash follows later | Inflates IRR but not MOIC; always ask for with-line and without-line IRRs when comparing funds | capital-calls |
| Recallable distribution | Distribution the GP can demand back within a specified window for reinvestment or expenses | Never model as permanent income until the recall window closes and is confirmed expired | distributions |
| Equalisation | Ensures late-close LPs are economically equivalent to first-close LPs regardless of join date | Two distinct costs: catch-up contribution (capital share) and equalisation interest (time value) | equalisation |
| KYC / AML | Identify investor, verify identity, confirm source of funds, identify UBOs; ongoing obligation | AML is not just at onboarding — risk profiles must be monitored and refreshed over time | onboarding-and-kyc |
| PIK interest | Interest added to loan principal rather than paid as cash; NAV and income rise on paper | High PIK exposure may signal borrower cash stress, not just structural preference — check cash metrics | private-credit |
Group 6 — Risk Concepts
| Concept | One-line reminder | Watch out for | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
| Liquidity risk | Risk that capital cannot be accessed or assets sold at fair value when needed | Overcommitment (LP side) and simultaneous redemptions (fund side) are the two key forms | liquidity-risk |
| Leverage risk | Debt amplifies equity losses — a moderate EV decline can wipe out all equity at high LTV | Distinguish asset-level (LBO), fund-level (NAV facility), and subscription-line leverage — different impacts on LP NAV | leverage-risk |
| Concentration risk | Over-exposure across any of: asset, manager, sector, geography, vintage, liquidity type | Hidden concentration (same company held across multiple funds) is common and hard to detect without look-through | concentration-risk |
| Operational risk | Risk from failed processes, systems, counterparties, or human error; independent of investment returns | Manual processes and data fragmentation make alternatives particularly exposed to operational risk | operational-risk |
| Valuation risk | Stated NAV may not reflect realisable value; most acute for Level 3 assets | GP incentives may delay markdowns; always read TVPI alongside DPI, not TVPI alone | valuation-risk |
| DSCR | Operating cash flow divided by total debt service; tests whether a leveraged entity can service its debt from operations | Below 1.0x means operations do not cover debt service; DSCR differs from interest coverage (ignores principal) and leverage ratio (stock, not flow) | debt-service-coverage-ratio |
| NAV facility | Fund-level credit secured against portfolio NAV; used in harvest phase for liquidity, follow-on, or distributions | LP interests are structurally subordinated to the lender; debt-funded distributions inflate DPI without representing actual exits | nav-facilities |
| Clawback | LP right to recover carry already paid to the GP if total fund performance falls short of what the waterfall entitles | Most relevant in deal-by-deal waterfalls; difficult to enforce once carry is distributed and taxed; escrow arrangements partly mitigate this | clawback |
| Responsible investment | Integration of ESG factors into investment analysis, ownership, and reporting; covers due diligence screening, portfolio monitoring, LP reporting | ”ESG integration” does not mean exclusion; different regulatory regimes (SFDR, UK SDR) impose different disclosure and classification obligations | responsible-investment |
Group 7 — Asset Classes
| Concept | One-line reminder | Watch out for | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
| Private equity | Equity investment in private companies; capital appreciation via exits; waterfall and J-curve apply | IRR and MOIC are primary metrics; DPI and vintage are essential context for comparison | private-equity |
| Private credit | Loans to private companies; income via interest and fees; seniority determines loss severity | PIK loans inflate reported income and NAV without delivering cash — check cash income separately | private-credit |
| Hedge fund | Open-ended liquid alternatives across diverse strategies; lock-ups, gates, HWM, and series accounting apply | ”Hedge fund” covers very different strategies; volatility and Sharpe Ratio are more relevant than IRR | hedge-funds |
| Real estate | Property funds; NAV from periodic appraisals; open or closed-ended structures | Annual appraisals create stale NAV between dates; INREV and RICS Red Book govern European non-listed RE | real-estate |
| Infrastructure | Long-duration essential assets; contracted cash flows; PE-like structure but different risk drivers | Regulatory and political risk can materially affect contracted revenues; often higher leverage than PE | infrastructure |
Group 8 — Source Anchors
| Concept | One-line reminder | Watch out for | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
| Source anchor | ## Source Anchors section in a knowledge file linking to the relevant public standard | Source notes are learning pointers only — always read the underlying documents directly | index |
| ILPA Templates | Standardised format for capital calls, distributions, quarterly reports, and fee disclosure | Templates = format only; they do not cover governance — that is ILPA Principles | ilpa-templates |
| ILPA Principles | Governance framework: LP/GP alignment, LPAC rights, fee transparency, fiduciary obligations | A GP can use ILPA-compliant report templates while operating with governance that breaches the Principles | ilpa-principles |
| IPEV Guidelines | Industry framework for fair value measurement of private capital investments | Principles-based; two GPs can value identically-structured assets differently and both be consistent with IPEV | ipev-valuation-guidelines |
| IFRS 13 | IASB standard defining fair value and the Level 1/2/3 hierarchy for IFRS reporters | ASC 820 is the US GAAP equivalent; which standard applies depends on the fund’s domicile and accounting basis | ifrs-13-fair-value |
| FATF Recommendations | International AML/CTF standard underpinning KYC obligations in most jurisdictions | FATF sets the international baseline; national implementation varies — the applicable rules depend on jurisdiction | fatf-recommendations |
| RICS Red Book | Professional standards for RICS-accredited property valuers; defines Market Value and independence requirements | Governs the underlying property appraisal input to real estate fund NAV — not the fund NAV calculation itself | rics-red-book |
| CRS / FATCA | Two tax transparency regimes: FATCA (US law) and CRS (OECD multilateral standard) require funds to collect investor tax residency data and report to tax authorities | Both impose direct obligations on funds as Financial Institutions — distinct from KYC/AML; collect different data, report to different authorities | crs-fatca |
| AIFMD Annex IV | EU regulatory reporting filed by authorised AIFMs to their national competent authority; covers portfolio, leverage, liquidity, and risk data | Systemic risk monitoring tool for regulators — not an LP-facing disclosure; data must be consistent with what is reported to LPs | aifmd-annex-iv |